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because of intoxication but nevertheless
escorted the employee to a motor vehicle
and allowed him to drive away could be
negligent." The Texas Supreme Court allowed the suit because in their view the
employer had "failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to third persons."
(/d. slip op. at 7).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in their opinion initially noticed the
similarity between the appellants' cause of
action and Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538,
4 76 A.2d 1219 ( 1984), a case decided by
the Supreme Court ofNew Jersey. After
stating the issue of whether an employer
who negligently "promotes and permits the
intoxication of an employee at the employer's premises during business hours and in
the course of an employer's party, and knowingly allows the intoxicated employee to
drive from his employment and negligently
collide with and kill another" can be held
liable, the court examined the line of cases
preceding the Kelly holding. Kelly stood
for the proposition in New Jersey that a host
at a party could be liable to a third party for
actions of "a person who was drunk and
who subsequently, in a motor vehicle collision, negligently injured the third party."
(/d. slip op. at 3). The court in the case at
bar clearly rejected such an application of
the Kelly holding in Maryland, stating that
Kelly did not suddenly appear, but "was
the end product of a progression of decisions." /d. slip op. at 3. See Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959);
Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J.
582, 218 A.2d 630 ( 1966); Linn v. Rand,
140 N.J.Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
The court continued that such an adoption
would be "out-of-the-blue", and not warranted because the general progression of
cases preceding the Kelly decision in New
Jersey, are not present in Maryland. Further, Maryland has "not adopted Kelly nor
has it seen fit, either judicially or legislatively, to embrace a dram shop law action."
See Felder v. Butler, 292 17 4, 438 A.2d 494
( 1981 ); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78
A.2d 754 (1951); Fisherv. O'Connor's, Inc.,
53 Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982).
Continuing, the court opined that Fisher
had specifically rejected the New Jersey
decision in Rappaport, 53 Md.App. at
340, and that other jurisdictions shared
the Maryland view.
The court then examined the argument
presented by the appellants regarding the
"special relationship." Although the court
acknowledged that the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel
County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078
(1986), and Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md.
236, 492 A.2d 1297 ( 1985), had adopted
the principle that there is no liability to a

third person absent a "special relationship"
with a clear right to control, the court in
Kuykendall found that there was "nothing
in the matter sub judice to suggest that Top
Notch had a right to control Wilke's actions after business hours." (/d. slip op.
at 6). In applying settled Maryland case
law, the court found a number of factors
for not imposing liability on the employer,
Top Notch. The court stated that "for an
employer to be vicariously liable for the
acts of an employee, the employee must be
acting within the scope of his or her employment." Dhanraj v. Pepco, 305 Md.
623, 506 A.2d 224 (1986); Watson v.
Grimm, 200 Md. 461,90 A.2d 180 (1951).
First, the court found that the appellants
had not indicated in their complaint that
Wilkes was acting within the scope of his
employment when the collision occurred.
Second, the accident took place off the
business premises, after working hours,
and Wilkes was operating his own vehicle.
Third, the court reasoned since the party
was not mandatory, the party could not
have been furthering a business purpose of
the employer, and therefore the employer
could not be held vicariously liable for the
acts of its employee, Wilkes. /d. slip op.
at 7.
When the court examined the second
argument of the appellants it noted that
Otis apparently followed a California case,
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264
Cal.App. 2d 69, 70 Cal.Rptr. 136 (1968).
The California court found that "affirmative acts" of the employer, and ordering
him to drive home "imposed a duty on the
employer to exercise reasonable care." /d.
slip op. at 8. The Court ofSpecial Appeals
of Maryland then distinguished the Otis
and Brockett cases, by examining Pinkham
v. Apple Computer, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 387
(Tex.App. 1985). Pinkham dealt with an
employee at a company cookout. The
court there in holding for Apple Computer, Inc. found that the company did not
take any affirmative acts. Similarly, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
found that Top Notch took no affirmative
act with respect to Wilke's operation of a
motor vehicle. /d. slip op. at 9.
In addition to examining the appellants'
arguments, the court examined the legislative intent in expressly not establishing a
dram shop act. The court stated that the
legislature, not the courts, should create
such an act. The court pointed out that recent annual meetings of the General Assembly had not deemed such an act necessary. One explanation offered by the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland was the
illogic of holding an employer liable when
an employee voluntarily becomes intoxicated and then injures a third party while

liquor licensees, those in the business of
dispensing alcoholic beverages, are not
civilly liable to injured third persons. See
Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d
494 (1981); Fisher v. O'Connor's, Inc., 53
Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has declined the opportunity to expand
the law to allow the recovery of damages
from employers under the circumstances
of this case, which might have been called
"The Employers' Dram Shop Law." The
lack of an affirmative act by Top Notch, or
a showing of vicarious liability by the appellants was decided by the court to leave
the question of imposing such liability on
employers in the hands of either the General Assembly or the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in its role as "law giver".
-Robert L. Kline, III

Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Gilbert: ATTORNEY DISBARRED
FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
MATERIAL INFORMATION ON
HIS BAR APPLICATION
In Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Gilbert, 307 Md. 481, 515 A.2d 454
( 1986), Gilbert was disbarred due to his
failure to disclose, what the court considered, material information on his bar
application. The court of appeals rendered
this extreme sanction because of the seriousness of Gilbert's misconduct, which reflected on his fitness to practice law.
The nondisclosed item was Gilbert's
answer to question ten on his 1980 application. Question ten required:
"a complete list of all suits in equity,
actions at law, suits in bankruptcy or
other statutory proceedings, matters
in probate, lunacy, guardianship, and
every other judicial or administrative
proceedings of every nature and kind,
except criminal proceedings to which
I am or have ever been a party. (If
'NONE' so state)."
Gilbert at 457.
The answer given was "NONE". In
reality, Gilbert had filed a civil suit in the
Circuit Court of Baltimore County on June
4, 1970 to recover the benefits of two insurance policies on his wife's life, which he
obtained three months prior to her murder. The problem with the nondisclosure,
which made it material, was that Gilbert
was found in the civil trial to have had a
part in the murder, consequently he was
denied recovery. Specifically, Judge Proctor, who heard the civil trial, commented
in his opinion that "[T]he evidence is overwhelming that Gilbert intentionally caused
the death of his wife in order to reap the
Spring, 1987/The Law Forum-27

harvest, namely the proceeds of these two
life insurance policies .. ."Gilbert at 459.
Afterwards Judge Raymond G. Thieme,
Jr. of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County held evidentiary hearings pursuant
to Md Rule BV9 and used Judge Proctor's
findings to conclude that Gilbert purposefully failed to disclose the civil suit and
this nondisclosure was material so as to
violate DR 1-lOl(a) and DR 1-102 & (4) of
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. A judge's factual findings are
prima facie correct and will not be changed
unless clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Kemp 303 Md. 664, 674,
496 A.2d 672 (1985). The court of appeals
indicated that a person with a law degree
should be able to read question ten as
clearly asking for any and all involvement
in civil litigation and dismissed Gilbert's
claim that he had misread the question.
Gilbert was not a novice with the court
system as he had confrontations with the
law on many occassions during a six month
period in 1967. During this period, Gilbert
"was charged with conspiracy to commit
forgery, forgery and uttering, murder and
accessory to murder, homicide and assault." Gilbert at 455. Out of these charges
he was adjudicated guilty for forgery and
uttering and he was imprisoned between
November 1970 and August 1972. Shortly
after these charges, Gilbert was arrested
for the murder of his wife on June 4, 1967.
On March 13, 1969, Gilbert and his sister
were indicted for murder and conspiracy
to commit murder. When Gilbert's sister
was acquitted, his charges were nol prossed
on June 24, 1974.
Gilbert finally graduated from law
school in 1980 and completed the application in question on May 20, 1980. Shortly
thereafter, Gilbert's petition "for expungement of all the records associated with the
nol prossed indictment for his wife's murder" was granted on June 23, 1980. Gilbert
at 455. He passed the July 1980 Bar Examination and the next step was the character investigation to determine a candidate's present moral fitness to practice
law in Maryland.
The initial committee (character committee of the third judicial circuit), on October 21, 1980, recommended unanimously
not to grant admission. The State Board of
Law Examiners, pursuant to Rule 4c, concluded by a 3-2 vote that Gilbert be admitted since he had the present moral character fitness to practice law. The weight
used in these proceedings is clear and convincing evidence. See In re Application of
James G., 296 Md. 310,462 A.2d 1198
(1983). In that case, the court looked at
Gilbert's hardships through the years including "the birth of a Down's Syndrome
28-The Law Forum/Spring, 1987

child during his first marriage and the fact
that his first wife [was murdered]." Gz1bert
at 485. In determining his present moral
character, the court noted that the history
of criminal action occurred 16 years ago
and was within a six month period. Also,
the murder charge was nol prossed, and
since 1981 Gilbert had practiced in the
District of Columbia without incident.
However, when the civil suit came to the
attention of the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), they conducted evidentiary
hearings and filed a petition for disciplinary
action. Gilbert insisted his nondisclosure
was neither purposeful or material. Judge
Thieme thought otherwise for the following reasons: Gilbert's contention that the
application was done in haste was discounted
because by looking at the dates of his signatures it was determined that at least
three days transpired before the application
was submitted and the non disclosure of
the civil suit was purposeful because Gilbert had many opportunities to provide
this information, but did not.
The court of appeals found the context of
the word "material" as used in DR 1-10 l(a)
had never been previously defined in
Maryland. The court used several analogies to other areas of law such as summary judgment-"whether the resolution
of any material matter of fact may affect
the outcome of the case," King v. Bankered
303 Md 98, 111, 492 A.2d 688 ( 1985); and
insurance- an "ommission" is material ifit
would affect the insurer's decision about
providing insurance or evaluating the risk."
Maryland Indemnity v. Steers, 221 Md.
380, 385, 157 A.2d 803 ( 1960). The court
decided to adopt the definition that the
Supreme Court of North Dakota applied
in In re Howe, 257 N.W. 2d 420 (N.D.
1977), which dealt with the same rule as
the case at bar. Their definition of a material omission is one that "has the effect of
inhibiting the efforts of the bar to determine an applicant's fitness to practice
law." Id. at 422. Overall, the various standards reflect on how the decision-making
process is affected by a particular fact or
representation.
The court held that the nondisclosure of
the civil suit enabled Gilbert to use his expungement in a self-serving manner that
"plainly inhibited efforts to assess Gilbert's
present moral character fitness to practice
law." Gilbert at 460. Therefore, the omission was clearly material. Gilbert relied on
In reApplication of G.L.S., 292 Md. 378,
439 A.2d 1107 (1982) where there was
nondisclosure of a criminal conviction.
However, that case is easily distinguishable
because G.L.S. volunteered additional information during the admission process
unlike Gilbert.

Gilbert's other contentions were also
found to have no validity. Gilbert asserted
that the civil suit had no bearing on the disciplinary proceedings, but the court ruled
it was relevant in determining whether the
omission was deliberate which has a direct
bearing on one's present moral character.
Gilbert also complained that his mother,
father and a witness from his earlier trial
should have been allowed to testify at the
hearing. However, the witness' veracity
was not at issue so his testimony was properly excluded. The only testimony allowed
from Gilbert's parents was what state of
mind Gilbert had as he worked on the application and at no other time. Furthermore, Gilbert contends that the disciplinary hearings had the effect of convicting
him of his wife's murder thereby denying
him due process of law. However, this is
misplaced because the findings did not
determine guilt or innocence, but only had
a bearing on his fitness to practice law.
Thus, the court of appeals has provided
some guidelines as to what they consider a
material omission on a bar application. If
this omission reflects on a candidates truthfulness and candor, which is the most important character qualification, AGC v.
Levitt, 286 Md. 238, 406 A.2d 1298 (1979),
then strong disciplinary action will be called
for. To determine if a purposefully dishonest omission or misrepresentation requires disbarment as the proper sanction,
the court will mainly look to the severity of
the misconduct and any compelling extenuating circumstances.
-Robert Feldman

Department of Natural Resources v.
Welsh: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DID NOT BAR ACTION TO
QUIET TITLE
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that: ( 1) sovereign immunity did not bar action to quiet title
based on the Department of Natural Resources' allegedly unconstitutional taking,
and (2) that the department had not acquired interest in land belonging to plaintiff's predecessors, who had not been
named as parties in earlier condemnation
proceeding. Dep't. of Natural Resources v.
Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 517 A.2d 722 (1986).
As a result of this decision, the Rocky Gap
State Park in Allegany County has lost a
thirty three acre tract of land.
In 1983, W. Mitchell Welsh brought
suit against the Department of Natural
Resources to quiet title to land. Apparently, in 1966, the department obtained title to a 1,000 acre tract in Allegany County
through a condemnation proceeding. The

